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By DON BERGER AND BARRY SCHULMAN*
LEGISLATIVE amendment and judicial interpretation of section
23103 of the California Vehicle Code have limited the applicability
of this statute to conduct which exceeds even gross negligence. It is
the purpose of this comment to examine the basis of this limitation
and to question the desirability of its retention.
Driving in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property constitutes the public offense of reckless driving in California.1
An inquiry into the nature of the offense and the elements needed for
conviction discloses that the lack of appeals from convictions under this
statute can be traced to the small number of prosecutions under it.'
Law enforcement agencies prefer to prosecute misconduct on the high-
way under more specific statutes the violation of which requires no
proof of any special mental element accompanying the unlawful con-
duct.' Much of the reported judicial interpretation of the statute is
contained in cases where the prosecution relied on the reckless driving
statute as an afterthought because the evidence would not support the
charge actually filed against the defendant.4 The most striking fact
*Members, Second Year Class.
'CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103: "Any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway in wilful
or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving....."
Only .18 per cent of the total citations issued for vehicle code violations in 1961 were for
reckless driving. California Highway Patrol, Annual Statistical Report (1961).
' Officers of the California ighway Patrol will issue citations for those violations which
are capable of observation, such as failure to observe a stop sign or stop light, exceeding speed
limits or driving while intoxicated, even though the driver's conduct may warrant more serious
punishment. Only if the driver's actions have been so extreme as to allow no possible contra-
diction does the officer feel certain enough to issue a citation for reckless driving. But short of
driving along San Francisco's Market Street at five o'clock in the afternoon at a speed of
eighty miles per hour, no such certainty exists. Telephone conversation with Lt. Vance,
California Highway Patrol, San Francisco, November 5, 1962.
' People v. Schumacher, 194 Cal. App. 2d 335, 14 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1961) ; People v. Clen-
ney, 165 Cal. App. 2d 241, 331 P.2d 696 (1958); People v. McGrath, 94 Cal. App. 520, 271
Pac. 549 (1928).
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is that cases concerned solely with reckless driving were most numerous
in the early days of the statute.5 No leading appellate case involving
a prosecution and conviction for reckless driving bears a date later
than 1941. An examination of the legislative development and judicial
interpretation of the statute reveals the probable causes of the
diminished importance of the reckless driving statute.
Origin and Legislative History
The origin of the reckless driving statute was a simply worded
enactment in 1915 which merely required users of the highway to
drive carefully and to stay on the right side of the road whenever pos-
sible.' Subsequent statutes continued to be broadly worded in describ-
ing the offense. By 1923 driving without due caution and circumspec-
tion was considered reckless! "Due caution and circumspection"
imports negligence, that is, negligence of so great a character as to be
criminal in nature.' The 1929 amendment was directed against driving
in so negligent a manner as to indicate either a wilful or wanton dis-
regard for the safety of persons or property.' The legislature seemed
to be narrowing the scope of the offense.1" The 1935 amendment elimi-
nated the word "negligent,"'" and in 1939 the statute presently in force
was adopted. 2
During the course of the statute's legislative history attacks on its
constitutionality were consistently unsuccessful.1 The statute does not
'People v. Peet, 108 Cal. App. 775, 288 Pac. 44 (1930) ; People v. Nowell, 45 Cal. App.
2d Supp. 811, 114 P.2d 81 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los Angeles 1941) ; People v. Thompson,
41 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 965, 108 P.2d 105 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., San Diego 1940) ; People v.
McNutt, 40 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 835, 105 P.2d 657 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los Angeles 1940) ;
People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 748, 92 P.2d 1039 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los Angeles
1939) ; People v. Steel, 35 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 748, 92 P.2d 815 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., San
Diego 1939).
Cal. Stat. 1915, c. 188 § 20, p. 406.
Cal. Stat. 1923, c. 266 § 121, p. 557.
People v. Crossnan, 87 Cal. App. 5, 261 Pac. 531 (1927).
Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 253 § 49, p. 539.
'o People v. Marconi, 118 Cal. App. 683, 5 P.2d 974 (1931).
" Cal. Stat. 1935, c. 764, p. 2141.
1 Cal. Stat. 1939, c. 658 § 3, p. 2107.
" People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 748, 92 P.2d 1039 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los
Angeles 1939) ; People v. Steel, 35 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 748, 92 P.2d 815 (App. Dep't, Super.
Ct., San Diego 1939). The statute's constitutionality was attacked in both cases on the ground
that the word indicate, not being followed by explicit words establishing to whom the manner
of driving had to indicate wilfulness or wantonness, resulted in unconstitutional ambiguity.
The court held that the procedural framework of other statutes envisioned a weighing of the




deprive a defendant of due process of law by failing to establish a
clearly recognizable standard of guilt. The description of the conduct
to be punished is sufficiently clear to inform drivers what acts or manner
of driving would exceed the bounds of permitted conduct.14 Neither
does the statute punish a mere state of mind. Its purpose is to punish
a manner of driving which necessarily includes a series of overt acts
capable of observation and narration by witnesses. The reference to
a state of mind is merely for a description of the prohibited acts.15
The Mental Element
Judicial definition of the state of mind requisite to the act was
rather unsuccessful in the earlier cases. The search for a precise inter-
pretation of the reckless driving statute ended abruptly with People
v. McNutt. 6
McNutt's auto struck the back of a car which had backed up to make
a left turn. The appellate court reversed a conviction for reckless
driving by holding that the evidence suggested negligence, but not
reckless driving. In the course of its opinion the court defined the
phrase "wilful or wanton disregard." "Wilful," said the court, meant
intentional, but this was understood to be the intentional disregard for
safety and not intentional doing of the act." "Wanton" included the
elements of consciousness of one's conduct, intent to do or omit the
act in question, realization of the probable injury to another, and reck-
less disregard of the consequences." s These definitions were not new.
They had been used many times, but not to define reckless driving.
Until then their application had been limited to the interpretation of
"wilful misconduct," which term was the criterion establishing a
driver's liability for injury to guests in his automobile.' The McNutt
case established the rule that there was no difference between wilful
misconduct under the so-called "guest statute," and "wanton or wilful
disregard" under the reckless driving statute."0 The terms were
synonymous.
By restating the definition and interpretation of "wilful miscon-
duct," McNutt and subsequent cases encountered no difficulty in holding
" People v. McNutt, 40 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 835, 105 P.2d 657 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los
Angeles 1940) ; People v. Smith, supra note 13.
"Ibid.
1040 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 835, 105 P.2d 657 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los Angeles 1940).
1 Ibid.
Ibid.
"CAL. VEH. CODE § 403; now § 17158.
2040 Cal. App. 2d Sup. 835, 105 P.2d 657 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los Angeles 1940).
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negligence, even gross negligence, insufficient to sustain a conviction
for reckless driving."' The wilful misconduct necessary under guest
statute cases had established this rule many years earlier.22
Two years after McNutt, in People v. Young,23 the court considered
the elements of "negligent homicide," another vehicle code violation.24
This law contemplated a state of mind which consisted of reckless dis-
regard and wilful indifference to the safety of others. The court, rely-
ing on McNutt, held that the mental element necessary for conviction
of negligent homicide was the same as that required for reckless driv-
ing.25 Thus, three statutory violations (reckless driving, wilful mis-
conduct, and negligent homicide) required the same mental element
for guilt.
Wilful Misconduct
The definition which has received the most careful analysis is the
term "wilful misconduct" as used in the guest statute. Without regard
to the problem of liability to guests it is helpful to investigate the term
in order to see how it is applied to reckless driving cases.
In 1914 a Massachusetts court defined "wilful misconduct," under
a Workmen's Compensation Act," as "conduct of a quasi criminal
nature, the intentional doing of something either with the knowledge
that it is likely to result in serious injury, or with a wanton and reckless
disregard of its possible consequences."2 While the word, "inten-
tional," is a necessary element throughout, the definition really estab-
lished two separate and distinctive states of mind. One is the state of
mind necessary to do an act with knowledge that injury to others may
occur. The other refers to the doing of an act, perhaps without knowl-
edge that injury will occur, with reckless abandonment to its eventual
outcome. This concept of wilful misconduct was used by a California
court in 1919.2" Several years later, in Howard v. Howard,29 it was held
21 People v. Schumacher, 194 Cal. App. 2d 335, 14 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1961) ; People v. Alli-
son, 101 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 932, 226 P.2d 85 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., San Diego 1951);
People v. Thompson, 41 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 965, 108 P.2d 105 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., San
Diego 1940) ; People v. McNutt, 40 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 835, 105 P.2d 657 (App. Dep't, Super.
Ct., Los Angeles 1940).
2 Kastel v. Stieber, 215 Cal. 37, 8 P.2d 474 (1932) ; Helme v. Great Western Milling Co.,
43 Cal. App. 416, 185 Pac. 510 (1919).
- 20 Cal. 2d 832, 129 P.2d 353 (1942).
24 CAL. VEH. CODE § 500, repealed 1943.
22 People v. Young, 20 Cal. 2d 832, 129 P.2d 353 (1942).
"6 Mass. Stat. 1911, c. 751, Part II, § 3.
"In re Burns, 218 Mass. 8, 10, 105 N.E. 601, 602 (1914).
28 Helme v. Great Western Milling Co., 43 Cal. App. 416, 185 Pac. 510 (1919).
29 132 Cal. App. 124, 22 P.2d 279 (1933).
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that the difference between the two states of mind was that in the
former the driver has knowledge that a serious injury would be a
probable result, while in the latter the driver's acts have to occur in
reckless disregard of their possible result.3 0
Application of "Wilful Misconduct" to Reckless Driving
In People v. Thompson3 ' the defendant was weaving back and forth
between traffic lanes. His conviction for reckless driving was reversed
because he did not have knowledge or an appreciation of the fact that
danger was likely to result therefrom. It appears that the court did
not consider the second mental element, as it was defined by the Massa-
chusetts court, which did not require knowledge as a necessary in-
gredient for the offense. In People v. NowellV2 defendant was convicted
for driving at a speed of from 80 to 85 miles per hour and passing 21
cars in a 4.3 mile stretch of highway. Relying on Thompson, the
appellant argued that unless the prosecution could prove that he knew
that his driving would result in disaster, the conviction could not be
sustained. Proof of such knowledge was one way to sustain the con-
viction, the court agreed, but not the only one. If the defendant were
driving so as to show a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible
consequences to persons and property, although he did not know as a
fact that his driving would probably injure someone, his guilt would,
nevertheless, be established.3 The two alternative mental elements
first analyzed by the Massachusetts court in 1914 were being fully
applied by the California courts.
Proof of the defendant's awareness that his acts might result in
probable injury is a difficult burden on the prosecution. Van Fleet v.
Heyler,84 a suit for damages under the guest statute, firmly established
a rule in this field that had long been accepted in general tort law.
Proof of knowledge need not be established by the testimony of the
accused, a rather unlikely prospect at best, but knowledge can be in-
ferred by the jury if they feel that a reasonable, ordinary man would,
under the same circumstances, know that his acts are probably going
to cause injury.35 Heyler was driving at night on a narrow, curving
" Ibid. If a result is probable, there is more evidence for than against that it will happen.
A possible result is within the powers of one's attainment, that is, it could happen because it
is within the limits of one's capacity. WEBSTEn, NEw INTERNATIONAL DicTIoNARY OF THE
ENGUiSH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1961).
a141 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 965, 108 P.2d 105 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., San Diego 1940).
45 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 811, 114 P.2d 81 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los Angeles 1941).
"Ibid.
8' 51 Cal. App. 2d 719, 125 P.2d 586 (1942).
" Ibid.
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road at a speed of 85 miles per hour. The lights of a packmule station
ahead did not influence him to reduce his speed. He went into a ditch
when he had to swerve to avoid mules crossing the road near the station.
The defendant pleaded lack of knowledge that injury would probably
occur from his acts. The court stated that express knowledge by de-
fendant's testimony need not be proved. Knowledge could be implied
from the facts that defendant was familiar with the location, that he
had knowledge of the presence of other persons on the highway, and
from his persistent speed.3 6 The defendant also argued that he lacked
an intent to injure because his wife was in the car with him and that
he certainly had no intent to injure her. The court declared that wilful
misconduct does not require an intent to injure.37
Heyler embodies the California law regarding wilful misconduct
on the basis of knowledge, express or implied, that probable injury
would result from the defendant's acts. Hastings v. Serleto s analyzed
wilful misconduct based on intentional acts done in wanton and reckless
disregard of the possible consequences. There the defendant, anxious
to take a young girl into the foothills, raced up a narrow, winding
road. The girl and another passenger were locked in an embrace in
the back seat. The defendant testified that he kept glancing at the
couple in the back while maintaining his speed. His failure to heed
the hazards along the roadway resulted in a collision with a tree. The
defendant claimed that his conduct amounted to gross negligence at
most, and that he therefore was not liable under the guest statute. The
court rejected the claim. Gross negligence "is merely such lack of
care as may be presumed to indicate a passive and indifferent attitude
toward results, while wilful misconduct involves a more positive intent
actually to harm another or to do an act with a positive, active, and
absolute disregard of its consequences." 9 While there need be no ill
feeling on the part of the defendant, there must be an intent to mis-
conduct himself, or a wilful indifference to his acts.40
Specific Acts
Any attempt to establish a standard, the application of which will,
with infallible results, give an indication as to whether a particular
act or failure to act constitutes reckless driving is beset by the difficulty
'0 Ibid.
Ibid.
61 Cal. App. 2d 672, 143 P.2d 956 (1943).




that the determining factor in recklessness is the state of mind ac-
companying the act.
In jurisdictions which have adopted reckless driving statutes similar
to that of California, a general rule has evolved by judicial construc-
tion. It is that a specific act or omission to act while operating an auto-
mobile is not punishable as reckless driving if a statute exists to punish
that particular act or omission as a separate offense.41 This is, how-
ever, amplified by the exception that the circumstances surrounding
such act or omission may bring the offense into the reckless driving
category. California recognizes both the general rule and the excep-
tion."
Speeding
Violation of the legal speed limit, an offense punishable under
separate code sections, is not per se wilful misconduct.4" The offense
of reckless driving may involve the speed of an automobile,44 how-
ever, and the surrounding circumstances of a speed limit violation may
support the contention that it occurred in wilful or wanton disregard
for the safety of persons or property. 5 In affirming a conviction for
reckless driving based on excessive speed, one California court stated:46
Of necessity, when referring to the speed of an automobile, there is
involved the highway on which it travels, with its width, surface, and
the presence or lack of traffic upon it. There is involved, too, the factor
of visibility; was the car driven before or after dark? When considered
in relation to these matters mere speed, without other acts, may demon-
strate wilful misconduct or that the driving is reckless.
From this statement it would seem that the general rule against
punishment of an act or omission to act under the reckless driving
statute, where such an act or omission is made an offense by a separate
statute, is really meaningless. No act in connection with the operation
of an automobile occurs in a vacuum. There are always surrounding
"'Annot., 86 A.L.R. 1273 (1933) ; 52 A.L.R.2d 1337 (1957).
"People v. Nowell, 45 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 811, 114 P.2d 81 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los
Angeles 1941) ; People v. Thompson, 41 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 965, 108 P.2d 105 (App. Dep't,
Super. Ct., San Diego 1940) ; People v. McNutt, 40 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 835, 105 P.2d 657
(App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los Angeles 1940) ; People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 748, 92
P.2d 1039 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los Angeles 1939); People v. Steel, 35 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 748, 92 P.2d 815 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., San Diego 1939).
"Petersen v. Petersen, 20 Cal. App. 2d 680, 67 P.2d 759 (1937).
"People v. Peet, 108 Cal. App. 775, 288 Pac. 44 (1930).
"People v. Nowell, 45 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 811, 114 P.2d 81 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los
Angeles 1941).
" Id. at 813, 114 P.2d at 82. Accord, Hastings v. Serleto, 61 Cal. App. 2d 672, 143 P.2d
956 (1943).
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circumstances. It would perhaps be helpful to recognize that any act
or omission can constitute reckless driving if the necessary mental
elements of the offense can be established.47
Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor
A special problem is presented by cases in which the defendant is
found to be driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
This is made unlawful by two separate sections of the California Ve-
hicle Code.4"
Driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor does not
in itself establish that such driving was also reckless.49 Because of
the serious nature of such conduct courts will consider such driving
as raising a rebuttable presumption of lack of ordinary care;5o but
this recognition is limited in its practical effect to civil suits for dam-
ages for injuries proximately caused by the defendant, since more than
negligence is needed to establish wilful or wanton disregard of con-
sequences."i
In several instances trial courts have attempted to find a defendant
guilty of reckless driving when the information charged him with
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In one of the earliest
cases, People v. McGrath,12 the court informed the jury that reckless
driving is a lesser included offense in the charge of driving while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and that where a charge
includes two or more degrees of crime it is the duty of the jury to
return a verdict of guilty of the lesser offense if it entertains doubt
as to the degree of the crime committed by the defendant.53 The con-
" Wilful misconduct: Bechtold v. Bishop & Co., Inc., 16 Cal. 2d 285, 105 P.2d 984 (1940)
(failure to stop at stop sign). Gibson v. Easley, 138 Cal. App. 303, 32 P.2d 983 (1934) and
Browne v. Fernandez, 140 Cal. App. 689, 36 P.2d 122 (1934) (disregard of stop sign and
excessive speed). Reckless driving: People v. Thompson, 41 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 965, 108 P.2d
105 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., San Diego 1940) (weaving from traffic lanes). People v. Nowell,
45 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 811, 114 P.2d 81 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Los Angeles 1941) (speed-
ing). But see Hall v. Mazzei, 14 Cal. App. 2d 48, 57 P.2d 948 (1936) and MeLeod v. Dutton,
13 Cal. App. 2d 545, 57 P.2d 189 (1936) (excessive speed attained temporarily to pass another
car not held wilful misconduct). In other jurisdictions under similar statutes: Maughs v. City
of Charlottesville, 181 Va. 123, 23 S.E.2d 787 (1943) (driving without lights at night).
Commonwealth v. Diehl, 35 Pa. D. & C. 503 (1939) (failure to give left turn signal).
"s CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23101, 23102.
" People v. Clenney, 165 Cal. Ap. 2d 241, 331 P.2d 696 (1958).
" Christensen v. Harmonson, 113 Cal App. 2d 175, 247 P.2d 956 (1952).
s' See note 21 supra.
94 Cal. App. 520, 271 Pac. 549 (1928).
5 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1097: "When it appears that the defendant has committed a public
offense, and there is reasonable ground of doubt in which of two or more degrees he is guilty,
he can be convicted of the lowest of such degrees only." This section applies to lesser included
[Vol. 14
viction was reversed, the court holding that reckless driving is not a
lesser included offense.
The California courts have employed two tests for determining
whether reckless driving is a lesser included offense of driving while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The McGrath case relied
principally on the rule that all the elements of the lesser offense must
be included in the statutory definition of the greater offense.54 The
statutory definition of misdemeanor drunk driving punishes any person
who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor while driving a ve-
hicle upon any highway.55 The offense is complete when a person
under the influence of intoxicating liquor drives his car. The deter-
mining factor in such a prosecution relates to the mental and physical
condition of the driver, that is, his ability to operate his car.56 The
offense of reckless driving, however, refers to the manner in which
the car is being driven. Not only do the two offenses embrace different
factual components, but the determining mental element of reckless
driving is irrelevant in the former offense. 7
The second test is that a conviction or acquittal of one offense will
bar a prosecution for the other if the two are in fact a part of each
other.5 Since the two offenses in question are based on different
factual circumstances and differ in their necessary elements (one
punishing driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the
other punishing driving in wilful or wanton disregard of the conse-
quences), a defendant could be charged and convicted of both offenses
if he had indulged in liquor and then driven his car in such a manner
as to allow the necessary inference of wantonness or wilfulness.59 Such
wantonness or wilfulness must be inferred by the trier of fact from
the manner of driving, however, and not from the fact that the de-
fendant has indulged in intoxicating liquor.6"
Until the present time the courts have upheld the principle of the
McGrath case. Two recent cases, however, while affirming the principle,
offenses as well as to specifically defined degrees of a single offense. People v. Dewberry, 51
CaL 2d 548, 334 P.2d 852 (1959).
"People v. Kerrick, 144 Cal. 46, 77 Pac. 711 (1904) ; People v. Lewis, 186 Cal. App. 2d
585, 9 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1960).
" CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102.
" People v. McGrath, 94 Cal. App. 520, 271 Pac. 549 (1928).
People v. Clenney, 165 Cal. App. 2d 241, 331 P.2d 696 (1958).
'8 Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 640, 328 P.2d 976 (1958) ; People v. McDaniels,
137 Cal. 192, 69 Pac. 1006 (1902) ; People v. Helbing, 61 Cal. 620 (1882).
" People v. McGrath, 94 Cal. App. 520,271 Pac. 549 (1928).
'0 People v. Schumacher, 194 Cal. App. 2d 335, 14 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1961); People v.
Clenney, 165 Cal. App. 2d 241, 331 P.2d 696 (1958).
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seem to have indicated a possible way to reach the result of making
reckless driving a lesser included offense of driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.
In People v. Marshall61 the defendant was charged with statutory
robbery12 for "wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly" taking
an automobile. His conviction of auto theft, 3 as a necessarily included
offense, was affirmed by the appellate court. Even though the offense
of auto theft, as defined in the Vehicle Code, is not a lesser included
offense of the crime of robbery, as defined in the Penal Code, is not a
lesser included offense of the crime of robbery, as defined in the Penal
Code, the wording of the information was held sufficient to establish
the necessary elements of auto theft. While supporting previous rules
used in determining whether an offense is included, the Marshall case
established a new measuring device: a lesser offense is necessarily in-
cluded if it is within the offense specifically charged in the accusatory
pleading, even though its elements are not necessarily in the statutory
definition of the greater crime. 4
Dictum in People v. Clenney 5 intimated that if an accusatory plead-
ing charged driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in
such words as also to include the elements of reckless driving, a con-
viction of reckless driving would undoubtedly be sustained by applying
the rule of the Marshall case; i.e., determining whether the elements of
reckless driving were charged in the complaint-not whether they were
included in the statutory definition of driving while intoxicated.
In People v. Schumacher," the prosecution attempted to turn this
dictum into law. Schumacher was charged with wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously driving an automobile while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. His conviction for reckless driving, as a lesser
included offense, was reversed by the appellate court on the ground
that the use of the word "wilfully" in the information was not sufficient
' 48 Cal. 2d 394, 309 P.2d 456 (1957).
' CAL. PEN. CODE § 211.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 503, now § 10851.
64 48 Cal. 2d at 405, 309 P.2d at 462-3: "Since the decisions as to included offenses, so far
as they relate to choice of a standard to measure what offenses are 'necessarily included'
within the meaning of section 1159 of the Penal Code, have not expressly considered or de-
cided the question of selection as between the language of the accusatory pleading and the
statutory definition, we base our choice of the specific language of the accusatory pleading
upon considerations of fairness to both parties." Accord, People v. Williams, 189 Cal. App. 2d
254, 11 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1961) ; People v. Marquis, 153 Cal. App. 2d 553, 315 P.2d 57 (1957).
The effect of the Marshall case on the California law of included offenses is the subject of a
note in 45 CALIF. L. REV. 534 (1957).
" 165 Cal. App. 2d 241, 331 P.2d 696 (1958).
" 194 Cal. App. 2d 335, 14 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1961).
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to establish the element of "wilful disregard" needed for reckless
driving. The decision is limited to the point that the word as used in
the pleading was insufficient because it referred to the intentional doing
of the acts by the defendant, whereas "wilful" in the definition of reck-
less driving relates to the intentional disregard for safety.
This result leaves open the question whether an information charg-
ing driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor can be
sufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless driving, if additional words
in the pleading sufficiently allege wanton or wilful disregard for the
safety of persons or property. The determining factor will be how
broadly courts wish to apply the rule of the Marshall case. Even if
this application is to be limited by regarding as surplusage those ele-
ments in the accusatory pleading which are not considered a proper
part of the offense charged,67 the language of the Clenney and Schu-
macher cases strongly supports the assumption that a conviction for
reckless driving as an included offense would be sustained.
Conclusion
Legislative amendment and judicial interpretation have sharply
limited the applicability of the reckless driving statute. By successive
legislative changes the words suggesting negligence as an element of
the offense were deleted. The application of judicial interpretations
of "wilful misconduct" to the reckless driving statute may also have
affected the statute's usefulness. The guest statute sought to limit civil
liability. It incorporates a negative philosophy and its judicial appli-
cation has coincided with its legislative purpose. The reckless driving
statute is penal in nature. Its purpose is to- punish wrongdoers. The
application of interpretations of "wilful misconduct" may have done
more harm than good; for even though the words employed in defining
each concept may be outwardly the same, the connotative meanings
may not be synonymous. Whether, in the absence of this interchange
of words from two different areas, gross negligence might have been
found sufficient to constitute reckless driving is a question not com-
pletely irrelevant. That prosecutions for violation of the statute seem
to be rare is signficant, especially in view of the ever-increasing num-
ber of automobiles on the highways, the operation of which annually
increases the destruction of property and human life.
The majority of American jurisdictions have enacted reckless driv-
ing statutes to punish conduct exceeding the bounds of negligence or
"' FUCKE, CALIFORNIA CR mINAL LAW 41-42 (8th ed. 1961).
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gross negligence.6" But it is open to question whether these statutes
fulfill the function of deterring reckless conduct on the highway. Per-
haps a stronger deterrent effect would result from the enactment of
statutes punishing negligent, or grossly negligent, conduct as reckless
driving. Such statutes would certainly ease the burden of proof and
result in more prosecutions. The Wisconsin statute"" punishes as reck-
less driving the operation of a vehicle with a high degree of negligence,
such negligence exceeding ordinary, but falling short of gross, negli-
gence.7" Violations of this statute resulted in seventy-four convictions
out of eighty-one warrants issued in one year. And under a Milwaukee
city ordinance similarly defining the same offense, six hundred sixty-
seven prosecutions were brought in one year."
Judicial interpretation of the present statute is not likely to be
modified. But until a change occurs a useful weapon in the campaign
against careless driving is not being utilized to its full potential. Re-
luctance to punish negligent conduct as reckless driving is based on
the traditional aversion to imposing criminal sanctions for conduct not
involving criminal intent. An analogy may be helpful in demonstrating
the weakness of this argument. The Department of Motor Vehicles has
authority to suspend or revoke by administrative procedures the li-
censes of drivers who have violated certain sections of the Vehicle
Code.7" Such suspension or revocation occurs after the imposition
of criminal punishment. Yet the application of both criminal and ad-
ministrative sanctions for the same conduct is justified as furthering
the maintenance of safe highways for public use and does not inflict
"double penalties."73
Should that public interest in safety on the highways not also be
sufficient to support the punishment of negligent or, at least, grossly
negligent conduct? Legislative action to make the reckless driving
statute an effective deterrent to conduct which presently incurs small
pecuniary sanctions, or which goes unpunished, is the only alternative.
:" See note 41 supra.
' WIsc. VEH. CODE § 346.62. Other statutes punishing negligent conduct as reckless
driving: CODE OF ALA., Tit. 36, § 3; White v. State, 37 Ala. App. 424, 69 So. 2d 874 (1953) ;
Kirk v. State, 35 Ala. App. 405, 47 So. 2d 283 (1950) ; N. D. VE. CODE § 39-08-03; State v.
Sullivan, 58 N.D. 732, 227 N.W. 230 (1929).
70 O'Connell, Reckless Driving-Prosecution and Defense, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 210.
1 Id. at 217.
72 CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13200-13202, 13350, 13352, 13354-13356, 13358-13361, 13363.
" Beamon v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 180 Cal. App. 2d 200, 4 Cal. Rptr. 396
(1960) ; Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 177 Cal. App. 2d 440, 2 Cal. Rptr. 235
(1960).
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